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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
The appellants, a group of former mail room employees of 
the New York Times Company (the "Times") brought an 
employment discrimination action against the Times; its 
publisher, Arthur O. Sulzberger, Jr.; New York Mailers' 
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Union No. 6; and George McDonald, the president of the 
Union. The appellants were members of the Union while 
employed by the Times. All the appellants, female and male, 
Hispanic and non-Hispanic, alleged discrimination by the 
Times on the basis of sex. In particular, they alleged sex- 
based discrimination with respect to compensation and 
assignment of work and also retaliation; the female 
appellants also alleged sexual harassment. In addition, the 
Hispanic appellants alleged discrimination and harassment 
because of race, color, and national origin.2 
 
In response to the Times' pre-trial motions, the District 
Court dismissed the Amended Complaint in its entirety. 
The court reached the merits of the claims in only a few 
instances. Most counts were dismissed for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction due to the appellants' failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies or to their lateness infiling 
charges. The male appellants' sex discrimination claims 
were dismissed for lack of standing to sue under Title VII 
and NJLAD. The District Court granted summary judgment 
for appellees on the remaining counts. 
 
We conclude that the Amended Complaint should not 
have been dismissed in its entirety. With respect to the first 
issue before us, the standing of the male appellants to sue 
for sex discrimination, we will reverse. We do so based on 
our determination that "indirect" victims of discrimination 
have standing to sue under Title VII if they allege a claim 
of injury-in-fact that is redressable at law. As to most of 
appellants' other claims of sex and race discrimination and 
retaliation, we find either that the District Court applied an 
incorrect legal standard in finding that it lacked jurisdiction 
or that it misinterpreted the significance of certain evidence 
in the record that we find probative of discrimination. We 
will reverse the dismissal of these claims. We will, however, 
affirm the dismissal of the claims of sex discrimination and 
sex-based retaliation under section 1981 because section 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The appellants in this action include nineteen females and nine males; 
four are Hispanic. App. at 347. The Hispanic appellants' allegations of 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin will be 
referred to as "race discrimination," except where our analysis requires 
a distinction to be drawn among these categories. 
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1981 does not reach these forms of discrimination. We also 
will affirm the dismissal of the Labor Management Relations 
Act of 1947 ("LMRA") and the Labor Management Reporting 
and Disclosure Act of 1959 ("LMRDA") claims against the 
Union and the Times because the appellants failed to 
exhaust the Union's internal grievance procedures. In 
addition, we will affirm the dismissal of the discrimination 
and retaliation claims brought against the Union because 
the Union was not the appellants' employer and the 
appellants failed to exhaust the Union's grievance 
procedures. Finally, we will affirm the District Court's 
decision to deny the appellants' further discovery, but we 
will reverse the sanctioning of appellants' counsel for 
requesting reconsideration of the discovery decision. 
 
I. Factual Background 
 
The genesis of this case is a controversy between the New 
York Times and its union shop, on the one hand, and 
female and Hispanic workers on the other. Before the late 
1970s, the Times' mail room employees had been almost 
exclusively non-minority male. Even at present, women 
constitute only a fraction of the Times' mailers. Indeed, the 
Union and the Times do not dispute the appellants' claim 
that the Union admitted them reluctantly, under order of a 
review board. 
 
This dispute is a part of a lengthy history of competition 
among laborers for jobs in the New York metropolitan area 
newspaper industry. In particular, there has been a long- 
standing disagreement between labor and management 
concerning the use of substitute workers to assemble the 
newspapers. The success or failure of collective bargaining 
efforts to resolve this conflict is central to the allegations in 
this action. During the relevant period, the Union 
represented mail room employees at the Times, the New 
York Daily News, and the New York Post. 
 
A. Terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and the 
Baar Award 
 
In 1959, after a series of disputes between management 
and labor, an arbitration board, the Baar Commission, 
developed new practices for hiring and promotion of mailers 
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at various New York City newspapers. These practices were 
set forth in the "Baar Award." The Baar Award was 
designed to ensure the orderly hiring of extra workers when 
there was not sufficient regular staff to perform necessary 
daily tasks. 
 
In 1984, under the terms of the collective bargaining 
agreement (the "CBA") and the Baar Award, 3 the Times and 
the Union, along with other area publishers, agreed to a 
mail room staffing scheme. Under this plan, the mail room 
was to be staffed by two groups of workers: "situation 
holders," who were scheduled to work five shifts per week, 
and "extras," who were substitute workers. Extras were 
hired according to seniority at daily "shapes." Management 
determined extras' seniority on the basis of an annual 
review of their work records. This review was conducted 
each year on February 15. Seniority was determined by 
evaluating the mailer's position on the publisher's "priority 
list." The priority list divided mailers intofive categories, "A" 
through "E." When first hired, extras were placed into 
category "E." Extras might advance from category "E" to "D" 
on the priority list by working at least fifteen shifts per 
quarter of each year. Although extras might work shifts for 
any publisher who was a party to the CBA, extras would 
not appear simultaneously on more than one employer's 
hiring list. Moreover, continuous employment with a single 
publisher increased the likelihood of advancement on the 
priority list. Extras, who transferred from one publisher to 
another, received credit for shifts worked for the prior 
employer during the year; transfers were, however, placed 
at the bottom of the appropriate priority list category of the 
new employer. In this way, extras who expressed interest 
and were successful in obtaining employment at daily 
shapes -- preferably continuous and regular employment 
with a single publisher -- could advance along the priority 
list from category "E" to categories "D" and "A-B."4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. This CBA became effective on March 31, 1984, and, as a result of a 
series of modifications and extensions, runs through March 30, 2000. 
 
4. The Baar Award also provided for a "C" list. Mailers on the "C" list 
were not hired according to seniority, however, but "according to the 
needs of the office." 
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If the annual review of an extra's work record showed 
that he or she had worked at least 180 shifts during the 
preceding year,5 the individual would be placed into 
category "A" or "B" on the priority list. If, however, an extra 
failed to meet the requirements for advancement to "A" or 
"B" for two out of three successive years, that individual 
was demoted, or "delisted." Delisted mailers could reapply 
to work as mailers for publishers that were signatories to 
the CBA. Their status on a publisher's list would not, 
however, reflect credit for shifts worked prior to delistment. 
A four-person board, comprised of two representatives each 
from the Times and the Union, reviewed complaints arising 
from the delistment or transfer of extras. If this review 
board could not agree on the propriety of an extra's 
delistment or transfer, the complaint was referred to an 
arbitrator for resolution. 
 
B. The Appellants' Claims of Sex and Race Discrimination 
 
The appellants have been employed in the Times' mail 
room as extras. As such, they were subject to the terms of 
the CBA and the Baar Award. During the mid-1980s, the 
appellants were placed on the "D" priority list. Although the 
priority list system allegedly is a facially neutral process for 
assigning work to mail room employees, the Amended 
Complaint alleges that, during their employment at the 
Times, the appellants experienced sex- and race-based 
discrimination on a daily basis, which greatly limited their 
ability to advance on the list. The alleged discrimination 
occurred with respect to compensation, terms, and other 
conditions of employment; it included sexual and racial 
harassment and retaliation for the filing of the instant 
lawsuit and charges before the EEOC. The allegations of the 
Amended Complaint, recounted in the light most favorable 
to the appellants, are outlined below. 
 
1. Compensation/Assignment of Work 
 
During their employment by the Times, appellants allege 
that sex- and race-based discrimination repeatedly limited 
or impeded their ability to advance on the priority list and, 
thus, to obtain work and earn wages at rates comparable to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The requirement was 160 shifts prior to 1962. 
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those of males and/or non-Hispanic white workers. During 
the period from the mid-1980s through and beyond August 
of 1992, the appellants claim to have experienced 
discrimination in compensation and work assignment 
prospects. They allege that policies regarding seniority and 
hiring from the priority list repeatedly were manipulated in 
ways that limited the employment opportunities of female 
and Hispanic workers. They claim, for instance, that hiring 
for work shifts commonly stopped just before the names of 
women on the priority list were reached. The exclusion of 
women from employment caused them to lose hundreds of 
hours of work and wages and also to lose seniority. In 
addition, if hiring was stopped at the point where females 
showed up on the list, males who were listed among those 
females would not be hired. 
 
In other instances, appellants claim, the seniority system 
and Baar Award were violated altogether. On these 
occasions, men, who had less seniority on the priority list, 
were hired for work shifts instead of more experienced 
women. Appellants claim that this type of "leap-frogging" 
occurred repeatedly over time, including on the following 
dates: August of 1986, when approximately 275 Daily News 
mailers, the vast majority of whom were male, were placed 
ahead of female mailers on the Times' priority list; 6 March 
through June of 1998, when fifteen Post workers were 
placed ahead of female mailers on the Times' priority list; 
and October of 1990, when sixteen Daily News situation 
holders who were on strike from their paper were placed 
ahead of Times' mailers, including the appellants, causing 
the appellants to be unemployed for three weeks. 
Appellants contend that on these occasions and at other 
times men, who had or should have had less seniority than 
women on the list, were hired as substitute workers. 
 
Appellants also claim that, in numerous other ways, 
women were made to work under conditions that were 
different from and less favorable than the terms and 
conditions under which men, in particular non-Hispanic 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Appellants allege that many of the Daily News workers were allowed to 
maintain their position on the Daily News' priority list, in violation of 
the 
Baar Award. See, however, Part I.C for the Times' response to this claim. 
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men, worked. Appellants charge that the Times 
discriminated against them when assigning jobs. Appellants 
claim that women more often worked in unpleasant parts of 
the work place and performed the least desirable work. For 
example, rather than working on the presses or insert 
machines, women often worked in the hand insert section, 
or the "rock pile," an assignment that required constant 
standing, disposal of waste, and restricted movement. 
Women also routinely were assigned to perform 
objectionable tasks such as serving coffee to management 
and other personnel; men, including men with less 
seniority than women, were not asked to perform such 
chores. Women frequently were assigned to perform tasks 
that required them to work under close scrutiny of 
supervisors, while men were assigned jobs that allowed 
more autonomy. 
 
Appellants further charge that they were discriminated 
against in their benefits and compensation. Appellants also 
allege that women were required to clean up at the end of 
their shifts, whereas most men were not, and that women 
were consistently treated differently and worse than male 
employees with respect to work breaks. Women's bathroom 
breaks were counted as their coffee breaks, while men were 
permitted to take both coffee and bathroom breaks. Women 
were required to complete an entire work shift in order to 
be paid for the full shift, whereas men were paid for 
working the full shift even though they did not complete it. 
Women were not given "bonus" jobs, as were male workers. 
Regular situation holders frequently were hired for overtime 
shifts when extras were available for work, thereby allegedly 
decreasing work opportunities for female mail room 
workers. Appellants also claim that only women were 
required to work mandatory overtime when hired, 
sometimes five shifts in a row, so that they became 
exhausted and were discouraged from seeking work. Also 
they assert that women were denied medical and other 
benefits. 
 
Finally, the appellants make specific allegations 
concerning the Union. They claim that the matriculation of 
women into the Union was improperly delayed for arbitrary 
and discriminatory reasons. Even after they were 
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matriculated, the appellants allege that the leadership of 
the Union denied them the right to speak at Union 
meetings and otherwise to participate fully in the Union on 
the same terms as other members. In addition, the 
appellants contend that Union leaders ignored their 
complaints of harassment and discrimination, including 
complaints that the terms of the Baar Award often were 
violated or manipulated in a manner that diminished their 
employment opportunities. 
 
2. Sexual and Racial Harassment 
 
In their EEOC charges and the addenda thereto, the 
appellants claimed that they had been subjected to"an 
abusive atmosphere" because of sex.8  In the original and 
amended complaints, under a heading entitled "hostile 
work environment," the appellants alleged that crude 
language and behavior were directed at the female 
appellants by male co-workers. Appellants further stated 
that if they complained about such treatment, they were 
confronted with "ridicule" or "hostility." In addition, they 
alleged that a hostile work environment was created by 
"photographs of nude women and pornographic magazines 
[which] were displayed and directed at women."9 
 
The allegations regarding sexual harassment were 
described most explicitly in depositions and affidavits that 
appellants proffered in response to appellees' motions to 
dismiss their claims and/or for summary judgment. In 
these documents, appellants claimed that their workplace 
was an environment in which sexually harassing language 
and acts routinely were inflicted upon appellants by male 
employees of the Times and/or Union members. Appellants 
claimed that neither supervisory personnel at the Times nor 
Union officials proscribed such harassment, punished its 
perpetrators, or otherwise discouraged it. In particular, 
appellants alleged that the Times and the Union were aware 
of and allowed male employees to engage in the following 
conduct: the display of pictures of nude or lingerie-clad 
women throughout the work place, but especially in female 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. See, e.g., App. at 162. 
 
9. App. at 350. 
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workers' line of vision; the throwing and display of pictures 
of naked men near the door of the women's restroom, 
again, directly within women's line of vision; the verbal 
harassment of female workers; the "mooning" of female 
workers; and the hiring of a female stripper, who performed 
in the workplace during work hours, removing all of her 
clothing, with the exception of her "G string."10 
 
With respect to the alleged verbal harassment, male 
employees of the Times and/or Union members yelled at 
and otherwise subjected women to demeaning or 
threatening language. Appellant Ellen V. Sims alleged that 
she repeatedly was told, "a woman's place is in the kitchen" 
and that she was asked, "[W]hat are you doing here[?] 
[D]on't you got a home to go to[?]" When in 1993 two female 
appellants asked a foreman if they could use the restroom, 
they allegedly were told to "piss under the machine." 
During the Christmas season in 1991, Times' foreman 
Upton allegedly stated to appellants Nancy J. Simatos, 
Hilary Mendelson, and Lillian Sullivan, "If you want to be 
here to do a man's work, then work like a man . . .." One 
female appellant who needed assistance with her work from 
a male worker was told repeatedly to "get Jesus to help 
her," rather than him. Other male employees are alleged to 
have made the following remarks to various appellants: 
"[Management] never should have let women work here [the 
mailroom]"; "we don't want women here"; "they should 
never let women in the workplace--their place is in the 
kitchen"; "run without them [women] and you'll have no 
problems on the machine"; "if you want a man's pay, you'll 
have to do a man's work"; and "why don't you get out of our 
shop". Male employees also allegedly referred to women as 
the "bottom of the barrel."11 
 
Moreover, appellants claim that male employees of the 
Times and/or Union members frequently made offensive 
comments about women's anatomy. Foreman Larry 
Levinson allegedly made comments to appellant Sims 
"about the size of women's breasts" and "women's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. See, e.g., App. at 1688, 1691, 1736-40, 1756, 1795-96, 2115-16. 
 
11. See, e.g., App. at 1735, 1755, 1829, 1835, 1837, 1839-40, 2104-06, 
2187-88, 2206, 2262-63, 2318, 2360-65. 
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buttocks." Another employee yelled to an appellant who had 
been asked her priority number during a hiring session, "Is 
that your number or your bust size?" Appellant Anna Marie 
Trause's breasts were called "bouncy," and her mail 
coworkers nicknamed her "Bouncy." Again, referring to 
Trause's breasts, supervisor Ackerman would "turn around 
to the guys" and comment "moo, moo ... do you want some 
milk?" Ackerman repeatedly made this taunt concerning 
Trause's breasts over the course of the work day, with other 
male workers responding with laughter. Supervisor 
Zimmerman allegedly told Trause and other women to "go 
back to your hands and knees, that's where you belong to 
begin with." Appellant Anjelino was told that she "looked 
like a man."12 
 
In addition to these comments and to the discriminatory 
assignment of work, the Hispanic appellants claim that 
they were subjected to racially harassing statements. These 
statements included being told on several occasions, "Go 
back to Puerto Rico if you can't run the machine." On 
numerous occasions, the Hispanic appellants allegedly were 
told: "[S]peak English, no Spanish. ... We're in America," or 
"Habla Ingles?" Moreover, they claim to have been 
constantly taunted with comments like, "You guys make 
good rice and beans, right?"12 
 
As a result of such verbal and sexual harassment, the 
appellants were often emotionally distraught at work, many 




The appellants assert that this conduct increased after 
they complained about their mistreatment. For example, in 
a letter to appellee Sulzberger, dated January 30, 1992, 
appellants' counsel set out the basis for this suit. Shortly 
thereafter, a copy of the letter was allegedly posted on two 
employee bulletin boards, with derogatory phrases written 
across the letter such as: "Dykes unite," "Eat Shit," "Ass 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. See, e.g., App. at 1571, 1798-1800, 2104-05, 2314, 2329-31, 2358- 
59. 
 
12. See App. at 1861-66, 1999-2022, 2235, 2256-58. 
 
13. See, e.g., App. at 1696, 1798-1801, 1835, 1866, 1868, 1863, 2368. 
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Holes," "Burger King is hiring," "Scabs," and "Anti-Union." 
One of the bulletin boards on which the defaced letter was 
placed was enclosed in glass and locked; only Times' 
supervisors had keys to it.14 
 
The retaliation became harsher after the administrative 
complaints and the suit were filed in May and June of 
1992. For example, on June 25, 1992, just after suit was 
filed, the president of the Union allegedly read off the list of 
plaintiffs' names at a union meeting. Another Union official, 
Tommy Murphy, allegedly told some of the female 
appellants, "If you think you're being discriminated against 
now, wait until we get through with you." Moreover, 
appellants claim that appellees accelerated the practice of 
allowing men, who had not met the requirements for 
progressing on the priority list, to leap-frog over the 
appellants. Finally, in August of 1992, all but one of the 
appellants were delisted from the priority list although 
other mailers who had not complied with the terms of the 
Baar Award were not. Appellants assert that the delistment 
was improper under the terms of the Baar Award. However, 
rather than helping the appellants, the Union delayed their 
appeal of the delistments. 
 
Even after the delistment of the appellants, the Times 
and the Union allegedly continued to retaliate against them 
for complaining about their mistreatment. Although many 
jobs were open, the Times usually hired new personnel, 
including non-Union workers, rather than the delisted 
appellants. When appellants were finally rehired, they were 
assigned to the worst available jobs. Co-workers continued 
to harass them verbally; some appellants also claim to have 
been physically threatened by co-workers. When appellants 
complained repeatedly about this mistreatment, the Union 
failed to address or to ameliorate it.15  
 
C. The Appellees' Rebuttal 
 
In response to the appellants' allegations, the Times 
argues that at all relevant times it complied with the Baar 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. See App. at 1110-11, 1114, 1126, 1142-43. 
 
15. App. at 1764-78, 1790-93, 1803-08, 2097-2101, 2111-12, 2345, 
2350-55. 
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Award's policies on delistment. The Times asserts, for 
instance, that the appellants' claims that extras were not 
hired according to seniority is wrong, that "most plaintiffs 
freely admitted" as much, and that the appellants' 
"generally conceded" that the least desirable jobs were 
assigned to those with the least priority. The Times also 
claims that the appellants' complaint regarding the"leap- 
frogging" of 275 Daily News and Post workers over them in 
1987 was settled on appeal by an arbitrator, who ruled 
against the appellants.16 Moreover, the Times and Union 
argue that contrary to the appellants' contentions, all 
extras who failed to meet the Baar Award criteria for 
remaining on the Times' priority list were delisted in 1989, 
1991, and August 1992. Therefore, they claim, the 
delistment of the appellants was not a result of 
discrimination, but rather, of their failure to meet neutral 
criteria for continued employment as extras. The Union also 
submits that five of the delisted appellants were reinstated 
after their claims were reviewed by the arbitrator. 
 
Moreover, the Times claims that, even if true, the 
appellants' allegations that they were subjected to 
discriminatory treatment with respect to "taking of breaks, 
using the restrooms, getting coffee for other employees" and 
other situations "amounted to no more than slight 
annoyances" based on the appellants' "subjective beliefs." 
The Times and the Union argue that the appellants never 
complained about these incidents, either to the Times 
management or through the Union's grievance procedures. 
 
The Times disputes the appellants' claims that 
"inappropriate pictures of undressed or partially undressed 
women" were posted in the workplace. In addition, the 
Times notes that none of the appellants allege that such 
pictures were posted after mail room operations moved to a 
new plant. The Times argues that, due to the date of the 
move, these claims are untimely. In addition, the Times 
notes that the appellants never complained about these 
postings, either to the Times management or through the 
Union's grievance procedures. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Citing Anjelino v. New York Times, 1993 WL 170209 at *5-6 (D.N.J. 
May 14, 1993). 
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Regarding the sexually and racially harassing language, 
the Times contends that these claims are not sufficiently 
specific because the appellants are not "able to attach a 
date to them." In addition, the Times claims that"only 
coworkers" made the comments. Finally, the Times notes 
that the appellants never complained about these 
comments, either to the Times management or through the 
Union's grievance procedures. 
 
The Times and the Union respond to the allegations that 
the Union violated the LMRA and LMRDA with the 
argument that they complied with the Baar Award, a claim 
which "none of the plaintiffs . . . disputes." At the same 
time, the Times asserts that "the few plaintiffs who 
attempted to give any examples of alleged breaches of the 
[CBA] or the Union's duty of fair representation related 
nothing but subjective beliefs and/or incidents that were 
time-barred." Moreover, appellants did not file the 
appropriate grievances with the Union. 
 
II. Procedural History 
 
A. EEOC Charges and The Complaint 
 
Between May 21 and July 30, 1992, the appellantsfiled 
charges of sex and/or race, color, and national origin 
discrimination and retaliation with the EEOC and the New 
Jersey Division of Civil Rights ("NJDCR"). 
 
The charges of the female appellants alleged that 1) they 
were "subjected to terms and conditions of employment less 
favorable than that accorded of [sic] male mailers, including 
but not limited to being denied equal numbers of work 
shifts"; 2) that they "complained about the discriminatory 
treatment accorded them"; 3) that "[s]uch discriminatory 
terms and conditions of employment was [sic] even more 
intensified and continued throughout [their] tenure"; 4) that 
they were "discriminated against with respect to wages, 
benefits, abusive atmosphere and other terms and 
conditions of employment, because of sex and retaliation"; 
and 5) that "[t]he discrimination ... is a part of a pattern 
and practice of sex discrimination" that "resulted from a 
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continuing and intentional policy of sex discrimination by 
respondents, which predates 1980."17  
 
The charges of the male appellants included all the 
allegations made by female appellants, with the exception of 
the first one. In addition, the male appellants alleged that 
the men were "discriminatorily treated because [their] 
priority number[s] on the workplace seniority list [were] in 
between the priority numbers of the women mailers. Such 
discrimination was based on sex."18  
 
The charges of the Hispanic appellants included all the 
allegations made by female appellants (with the exception of 
the one Hispanic male appellant, whose charges included 
the allegations made by the male appellants). In addition, 
the Hispanic appellants alleged that they were accorded 
less favorable terms and conditions of employment than 
that accorded "White . . . mailers" and that the pattern of 
discrimination to which they were subjected also was based 
on "race, national origin and color discrimination by 
Respondents, which predates 1980."19  
 
On September 17, 1992, appellants' counsel wrote to the 
EEOC, requesting "right to sue" letters because he had 
been informed by the EEOC that it could not complete its 
investigation within 180 days. Each appellant received a 
"notice of right to sue," dated October 5, 1992. 
 
This action was filed in federal District Court on June 25, 
1992. On August 24, appellants' counsel faxed a copy of 
the complaint to the EEOC. On September 17, twenty two 
of the appellants filed new charges with the EEOC. In the 
second group of charges, the appellants alleged retaliation 
by appellees as a result of their filing of the initial charges 
and the instant lawsuit. The EEOC apparently did not issue 
right to sue letters regarding the allegations of retaliation. 
 
B. The Amended Complaint 
 
The complaint was amended on October 9, 1992, to 
allege eight counts of sex, race, color, and national origin 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. See, e.g., App. at 162. 
 
18. See, e.g., App. at 174. 
 
19. See, e.g., App. at 192, 451. 
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discrimination and retaliation, in violation of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.S 2000(e); 
42 U.S.C. S 1981; and the NJLAD; violation of 29 U.S.C. 
S 411 et seq.; and violation of 29 U.S.C. S 185(a). The 
Amended Complaint also alleged continuing violations and 
retaliation, based on the appellants' delistment in August of 
1992 and other adverse employment consequences as a 
result of their filing of the initial EEOC charges and the 
original complaint in this action.20 
 
C. Disposition of The Claims 
 
In orders dated May 14, 1993, and September, 10, 1993, 
the District Court dismissed or limited all counts of the 
Amended Complaint, pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6), 
Fed. R. Civ. P. The majority of the Title VII and NJLAD sex 
and race discrimination and retaliation claims were 
dismissed, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), for failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies and for lack of timeliness, 
including lack of continuing violations; the male appellants' 
Title VII and NJLAD claims were dismissed under Rule 
12(b)(6), for lack of standing to sue. Anjelino v. New York 
Times, 1993 WL 170209 at *5, 8, 10-11 (D.N.J. May 14, 
1993); see also Anjelino, No. 92-2582 (D.N.J. Sept. 10 
1993). Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court limited the 
surviving sex and race discrimination claims brought under 
NJLAD to events occurring after June 1990 and the 
surviving race discrimination claims under Title VII to 
events occurring after July 1991. The section 1981 sex 
discrimination claims were dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) 
on grounds that they are not cognizable under the statute. 
Many of the section 1981 race discrimination claims were 
dismissed for lack of timeliness, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). 
Anjelino, 1993 WL 170209 at *11. The surviving section 
1981 race discrimination claims were limited to events 
occurring after June 1990. 
 
In the Order of May 14, 1993, and in an Order dated 
August 22, 1996, the court dismissed or limited the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. The Amended Complaint also added three new plaintiffs-appellants, 
Maureen Dolphin, Jacqueline Fogarty, and Ronald Plackis, who did not 
file charges of any kind with the EEOC. Anjelino, 1993 WL 170209 at *4. 
See discussion infra of exhaustion. 
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appellants' labor relations claims under section 301 of the 
LMRA and Title I of the LMRDA. Many claims were 
dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) for failure to exhaust and for 
lack of timeliness. The remaining LMRA claims were limited 
to events occurring after June 9, 1992. Anjelino, 1993 WL 
170209 at *14; Anjelino, No. 92-2582 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 
1996). 
 
In an Order dated July 8, 1993, the court denied the 
appellants' motion for reconsideration of the May 14 Order. 
Then, on September 10, 1993, the court denied appellants' 
motion to review the appropriate statute of limitations 
under the NJLAD. Anjelino, No. 92-2582 (D.N.J. July 8, 
1993).  
 
On January 29, 1996, the court affirmed the magistrate 
judge's recommendation to deny discovery to the 
appellants. Anjelino, No. 92-2582 (D.N.J. Jan. 29, 1996). 
On May 13, 1996, as a result of appellants' motion 
objecting to the discovery decision, the District Court 
sanctioned their counsel in the amount of $5,000, 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1927, on grounds that the motion 
was frivolous. Anjelino, No. 92-2582 (D.N.J. May 13, 1996); 
see also Anjelino, No. 92-2582 (D.N.J. May 1, 1996). 
 
In an Order dated August 22, 1996, the Court granted 
summary judgment for defendants on the remaining claims 
of the Hispanic appellants (which had been severed from 
the claims of the non-Hispanic appellants on October 25, 
1995, during the discovery process). These included Title 
VII sex discrimination claims by three female Hispanics, 
which related to events occurring after July 1991 and their 
NJLAD sex discrimination claims for events occurring after 
July 1990; the Hispanic appellants' race discrimination 
claims under section 1981 and NJLAD for events occurring 
after June 1990 and under Title VII, for events occurring 
after July 1991; the Hispanics' national origin claims under 
Title VII for events occurring after July, 1991; the 
Hispanics' retaliation claims under Title VII, NJLAD, and 
section 1981; and the Hispanics' LMRA claim for events 
occurring after June 9, 1992. Anjelino, No. 92-2582 (D.N.J. 
Aug. 22, 1996). 
 
Pursuant to an order dated March 2, 1997, the court 
dismissed the Amended Complaint in its entirety (i.e., all 
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remaining claims of the non-Hispanic appellants), including 
the remaining Title VII, NJLAD, and section 301 claims. 
These claims were dismissed on summary judgment 
grounds. Anjelino, No. 92-2582 (D.N.J. Mar. 2, 1997). 
 
III. Jurisdiction and Standards of Review 
 
We exercise appellate jurisdiction over the parties' 
appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291.21 The District Court 
had subject matter jurisdiction by virtue of 28 U.S.C. 
S 1331, as well as 29 U.S.C. SS 185(a) and 412, and 42 
U.S.C. S 2000(e). The District Court exercised supplemental 
jurisdiction over the pendant state claims pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1367(a). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. In an Order dated April 4, 1996, the magistrate judge severed the 
claims of the Hispanic appellants from those of the non-Hispanic 
appellants, after finding that discovery had been completed with respect 
to the former, but not as to the latter. Subsequently, on May 13, 1996, 
the District Court dismissed the claims of the Hispanic appellants. The 
claims of the non-Hispanic appellants were dismissed in an Order dated 
March 14, 1997. The Hispanic appellants filed an appeal of the May 
1996 Order dismissing their claims on March 18, 1998, at the same time 
that the appeal of the non-Hispanic appellants wasfiled. Thus, a single 
appeal was filed on behalf of all appellants. 
 
The Times argues that the appeal of the Hispanic appellants is 
untimely. The Times asserts that the Hispanics' notice of appeal should 
have been filed within thirty days of the May 1996 Order dismissing 
their claims. We conclude, however, that the Hispanics' notice of appeal 
was timely. This case was not appealable to the Third Circuit until the 
District Court reached a final disposition of all claims made by all 
parties 
to this action. See Andrews v. United States, 373 U.S. 334 (1963); 
Jackson v. Hart, 435 F.2d 1293 (3d Cir. 1970). The docket sheet in this 
action shows that case was closed on March 3, 1998, and that the 
record was deemed "complete for purposes of appeal" on March 30, 
1998. Thus, the entire controversy was resolved in March of 1998. To 
the extent that it is not clear that the entire controversy was not 
resolved 
until that date, the onus for the uncertainty lies with the court that 
issued the order severing the Hispanics' claims during the discovery 
process, rather than with the appellants. See Rule 54(b), Fed. R. Civ. P. 
(stating that in the absence of an express directive from the District 
Court, a judgment upon fewer than all claims or parties to an action 
does not terminate the action). 
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As to our scope of review, we will start our analysis with 
the District Court's dismissal of certain claims under Rule 
12(b)(1). The District Court's Opinion and Order of May 14, 
1993, dismissed many counts of the complaint for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction, based on the appellants' failure 
to exhaust administrative remedies and on the bar of the 
statute of limitations. In dismissing these counts under 
Rule 12(b)(1), the court did not attach any presumption of 
truthfulness to appellants' allegations but instead put the 
burden of establishing jurisdiction on appellants. See 
Anjelino, 1993 WL 170209 at *5, citing Mortensen v. First 
Federal Sav. And Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 
1977), and Millipore Corp. v. University Patents, Inc., 682 
F.Supp. 227, 231 (D. Del. 1987). 
 
There is a fundamental difference between review under 
Rule 12(b)(1), where existence of disputed material facts will 
not preclude the court from evaluating the merits of the 
jurisdictional claim, see Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891, and 
review under Rule 12(b)(6), where the court is required to 
accept as true all the allegations of the complaint and all 
inferences arising from them, see Hishon v. King & 
Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). Our first task is to 
evaluate the propriety of employing Rule 12(b)(1) in 
dismissing the counts that failed to meet exhaustion or 
timeliness requirements. Our review is plenary. Hornsby v. 
United States Postal Service, 787 F.2d 87, 89 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 
We conclude that the District Court erred in considering 
the Times' failure to exhaust and timeliness defenses as 
grounds for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction. Although it is a "basic tenet" of 
administrative law that a plaintiff should timely exhaust all 
administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief, the 
purpose of this rule is practical, rather than a matter 
affecting substantive justice in the manner contemplated by 
the District Court. The rule is meant to "provide courts with 
the benefit of an agency's expertise, and serve judicial 
economy by having the administrative agency compile the 
factual record." Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1020 
(3d Cir. 1997). Failure to exhaust is "in the nature of 
statutes of limitation" and "do[es] not affect the District 
Court's subject matter jurisdiction." Hornsby, 787 F.2d at 
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89 (citing Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 
392-98 (1982)). The characterization either of lack of 
exhaustion or of untimeliness as a jurisdictional bar is 
particularly inapt in Title VII cases, where the courts are 
permitted to equitably toll filing requirements in certain 
circumstances. Robinson, 107 F.3d at 1021 (citing Bowen v. 
City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 482 (1986)). 
 
Thus, the District Court should have considered the 
exhaustion and timeliness defenses presented in this case 
under Rule 12 (b)(6), rather than under Rule 12(b)(1). 
Robinson, 107 F.2d at 1022; accord Rennie v. Garret III, 896 
F.2d 1057, 1061-62 (7th Cir. 1990). As a result, we will test 
the exhaustion and timeliness defenses under Rule 12(b)(6) 
or Rule 56, as appropriate. 
 
Our review of the District Court's dismissal of appellants' 
Title VII, NJLAD, and section 1981 claims pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6) or Rule 56 is plenary. Ingram v. County of Bucks, 
144 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 1998); Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 
682, 684-85 (3d Cir. 1997). To the extent that the court 
considers evidence beyond the complaint in deciding a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion, it is converted to a motion for summary 
judgement. Rule 12(c); see also Robinson, 107 F.3d at 
1021. 
 
As with the anti-discrimination statutes, our review of the 
District Court's dismissal of appellants' LMRA and LMRDA 
claims on grounds of timeliness and failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies is plenary. Likewise, our review is 
plenary where the court granted summary judgment on the 
appellants' labor claims, pursuant to Rule 56(c). See 
Brenner v. Local 514, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & 
Joiners of America, 927 F.2d 1283, 1287 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
We review the District Court's order affirming the 
magistrate judge's decision denying discovery to the 
appellants, as well as the Court's imposition of sanctions, 
under an abuse of discretion standard. See Bayar AG v. 
Betachem, Inc., 173 F.3d 188, 189-90 (3d Cir. 1999); 
Fellheimer, Eichen & Braverman v. Charter Tech, Inc ., 57 
F.3d 1215, 1223 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 




A. Matters Dismissed on Preliminary Grounds 
 
We will start our consideration of the issues on appeal 
with the counts dismissed by the District Court on grounds 
of standing, failure to exhaust, and timeliness. 
 
1. Title VII and NJLAD Sex and Race Discrimination and 
       Retaliation Claims 
 
       a. Standing of Males to Sue for Sex Discrimination 
 
A party invoking federal jurisdiction must establish that 
he has standing to sue within the meaning of Article III, 
section two of the Constitution, which limits the courts to 
hearing actual cases or controversies.22  Standing is 
established at the pleading stage by setting forth specific 
facts that indicate that the party has been injured in fact or 
that injury is imminent, that the challenged action is 
causally connected to the actual or imminent injury, and 
that the injury may be redressed by the cause of action. 
See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560- 
61 (1992); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans 
United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 
464, 473 (1982). Courts assess whether a party has 
established injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability by 
considering whether the alleged injury falls within the "zone 
of interests" that the statute or constitutional provision at 
issue was designed to protect; whether the complaint raises 
concrete questions, rather than abstract ones that are 
better suited to resolution by the legislative and executive 
branches; and whether the plaintiff is asserting his own 
legal rights and interests, as opposed to those of third 
parties. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561-62. The requisite 
injury may be economic or non-economic in nature. United 
States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 686 (1973); Ass'n. of Data 
Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. Article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution states, in 
pertinent part, "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law or 
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States ... 
--to Controversies ... between Citizens of different States; ...." U.S. 
Const., art. III, sec. 2 
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(1970). The causation element requires that the injury 
"fairly can be traced to the challenged action." Whitmore v. 
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990). The redressability 
prong of the standing test is meant to ensure that the facts 
involved in a suit are conducive to judicial resolution and 
are likely to be resolved by court action. Valley Forge, 454 
U.S. at 472. 
 
In dismissing the male appellants' sex discrimination 
claims for lack of standing, the District Court reasoned 
that, to the extent that discrimination had occurred in the 
Times' mail room, it had been directed at females; thus, the 
male workers had not suffered harm and could not assert 
cognizable claims of sex discrimination. Anjelino, 1993 WL 
170209 at *10-11. This conclusion was predicated upon the 
court's understanding that, as a general matter, men do 
not have standing to bring claims of sex discrimination 
under Title VII. Id. at *10 (citing Spaulding v. University of 
Washington, 740 F.2d 686, 709 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 
U.S. 1036 (1984)). 
 
Relying on two Ninth Circuit cases, the court 
acknowledged, however, that three exceptions to this rule 
have been recognized. Anjelino, 1993 WL 170209 at *9-10 
(citing Patee v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 803 F.2d 
476, 478 (9th Cir. 1986); Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 709). The 
court found that a cause of action may lie under Title VII 
if male employees are subjected to discrimination"because 
they are men." Patee, 803 F.2d at 478. Second, reasoning 
by analogy from the Supreme Court's associational 
standing precedent in the context of race discrimination, 
the court concluded that male employees may sue under 
Title VII if discrimination directed at women results in a 
loss of interpersonal contacts or associational rights with 
women. Anjelino, 1993 WL 170209 at *10 (citing Trafficante 
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209-10 (1972)). 
Third, based on a ruling by a federal district court in 
Indiana, the court concluded that a cause of action may lie 
if sex-based discrimination results in pecuniary injury to 
both male and female workers. Anjelino, 1993 WL 170209 
at *10 (citing Allen v. American Home Foods, Inc., 644 F. 
Supp. 1553, 1557 (N.D. Ind. 1986)). 
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The District Court concluded that the injuries alleged by 
the male appellants in this action did not fall within any of 
these three categories. Therefore, the court held that the 
male appellants lacked standing to assert claims under 
Title VII and the NJLAD. Anjelino, 1993 WL 170209 at *10. 
The court did not, however, analyze appellants' claim that 
they suffered pecuniary injury because they were numbered 
on the priority list among women, who were not hired due 
to sex discrimination because hiring stopped when the 
women's names were reached. The court simply concluded, 
without further comment, that the alleged "multiple 
discriminatory acts aimed against women directly" were 
"without consequence to the male employees." Id. 
 
On appeal, the Times agrees in part with the District 
Court and argues that it is a well-settled proposition that 
men do not have standing to sue for discrimination against 
women. The Times rejects, however, the associational and 
pecuniary theories of male standing to sue for sex 
discrimination derived from Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209-10, 
and Allen, 644 F. Supp. at 1557, and contends that men 
may sue for sex discrimination only if they experience 
discrimination because they are men. The Times argues 
that it was proper to dismiss the male appellants' claims 
because these claims are based not on the male appellants' 
sex but "on their membership in a group with low-priority 
list placement that also included the female appellants and 
others who are not appellants." The Times does not, 
however, analyze whether the male appellants could state a 
colorable claim of injury-in-fact if they were not hired 
because they were listed among women who were not hired. 
 
The appellants argue to the contrary that the male 
appellants do have standing to sue based on discrimination 
directed, in the first instance, against female co-workers, 
because these males would not have been injured but for 
the Times' discrimination against the women. When the 
male appellants appeared at daily "shapes" for hiring, they 
were "sandwiched among the women on the priority list" 
and were not hired if the hiring stopped when the names of 
women on the priority list were reached. Thus, they 
suffered from the discrimination as well. 
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Appellants assert that their position on standing is 
supported by our decision in Hackett v. McGuire Brothers 
Inc., 445 F.2d 442 (3d Cir. 1971). We agree. In Hackett, the 
plaintiff, because of his race, had been subjected to a 
separate seniority and vacation schedule, intimidated, 
harassed, and ultimately discharged. Id. at 444-45. The 
District Court dismissed the plaintiff's Title VII claim for 
lack of standing because he had become a pensioner after 
being discharged by the defendant-company; thus, he was 
no longer an "employee" within the meaning of Title VII. Id. 
at 445. We reversed and emphasized our obligation to avoid 
construing the standing doctrine in ways that undermine 
Congress' objective in enacting Title VII. 
 
       The national public policy reflected . . . in Title VII . . . 
       may not be frustrated by the development of overly 
       technical judicial doctrines of standing . . .. If the 
       plaintiff is sufficiently aggrieved so that he claims 
       enough injury in fact to present a genuine case or 
       controversy in the Article III sense, then he should 
       have standing to sue in his own right and as a class 
       representative. 
 
Id. at 446-47 (emphasis added). 
 
In Hackett, we found Article III's case or controversy 
requirements to have been satisfied by the plaintiff 's 
allegations that demonstrated that he was a "person 
aggrieved" as required by the statute; he was"aggrieved" 
because he alleged that the employer had injured him in 
violation of Title VII while he was employed there. Id. at 
445. We concluded that at the pleading stage nothing 
beyond a colorable allegation of injury is required of the 
Title VII plaintiff. In Hackett, where the plaintiff claimed 
pecuniary loss, it was clear that the plaintiff had met his 
burden. Id. at 446 (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 
(1968)). 
 
Our decision in Hackett was cited with approval in 
Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209, the seminal associational 
standing case in the race discrimination context. In 
Trafficante, the Supreme Court found that two tenants who 
alleged a loss of the social and professional benefits of 
living in an integrated community, due to landlords' alleged 
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discrimination against racial minorities, had standing to 
sue under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 
U.S.C. S 3610(a).23 Id . at 212. Like our analysis in Hackett, 
the Trafficante Court's analysis was textual. The Court 
rejected an interpretation of Title VIII that would limit 
persons entitled to sue to "objects of discriminatory housing 
practices" because it found the definition of"person 
aggrieved" contained in section 810(a) of Title VIII -- "(a)ny 
person who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory 
housing practice" -- to be "broad and inclusive." Id. at 208. 
Thus, the Court concluded, "We can give vitality to [the Act] 
only by a generous construction which gives standing to 
sue to all in the same housing unit who are injured by 
racial discrimination in the management of those facilities 
within the coverage of the statute." Id. at 212. 
 
Subsequently, in Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Savings & 
Loan Assn., 584 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1978), rev'd on other 
grounds, 442 U.S. 366 (1979), we affirmed our view that the 
statutory language, "person claiming to be aggrieved," 
implied a Congressional intent to be liberal in allowing suits 
that effectuate the purposes of anti-discrimination statutes. 
In Novotny, we allowed a male plaintiff, who claimed to 
have been discharged for failing to adhere to a company 
policy of sex discrimination against women, to sue under 
42 U.S.C. S 1985. Id. at 1240-45. Our holding in Novotny 
was predicated upon the similarity in purpose and 
semantic structure between Title VII's enforcement 
provision and section 1985.24 Many courts have expressly 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
23. Title VIII is analogous to Title VII. Title VIII states, in pertinent 
part, 
"Any person who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory 
housing practice or who believes that he will be irrevocably injured by a 
discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur may file a 
complaint with the Secretary [of Housing and Urban Development]." 42 
U.S.C. S 3610(a). 
 
24. Cf. id. at 1244, "Section 1985(3) provides for a cause of action in 
any 
instance where `in furtherance of the object of' a proscribed conspiracy 
an act is done `whereby another is injured in his person or property.' By 
its terms, the statute gives no hint of any requirement that the `other' 
must have any relationship to the `person or class of persons' which the 
conspiracy seeks to deprive of equal protection, privileges or 
immunities," to Hackett, 445 F.2d at 445"[Section 706, 42 U.S.C. 
S 2000e-5] permits `a person claiming to be aggrieved' to file a charge 
with the Commission. . . . A person claiming to be aggrieved may never 
have been an employee of the defendant. . . . An aggrieved person 
obviously is any person aggrieved by any of the forbidden practices." 
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followed our reasoning and/or precedent concerning the 
significance of the language "person aggrieved" in 
construing Title VII's standing requirements in the race 
discrimination context.25 
 
Our case law also addresses the causation element of 
standing. In Rosen v. Public Service Elec. and Gas Co., 477 
F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1972), we considered causation in our 
analysis of standing in a Title VII case. Rosen  involved a 
retiree who challenged his former company's policy of 
linking an employee's sex with his or her required 
retirement age for full pension benefits. The trial court had 
found that when the plaintiff retired, he lost standing. Id. at 
92-94. Our standing analysis was based on the plaintiff 's 
status as an active employee at the time that the suit was 
commenced, id. at 94, and the pecuniary nature of 
plaintiff 's alleged injury. We observed that we had to 
determine whether "there is a logical nexus between the 
status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated." Id. 
(citing Flast, 392 U.S. at 102). Because the plaintiff 's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
25. See EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 482 (5th Cir. 1980), 
cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981) ("We agree with other circuits that have 
held that the strong similarities between the language, design, and 
purposes of Title VII and [Title VIII] require that the phrase `a person 
claiming to be aggrieved' in [Title VII] must be construed in the same 
manner Trafficante construed the term"aggrieved person' in [Title 
VIII]."); 
accord Clayton v. White Hall School District, 875 F.2d 676, 679-80 (8th 
Cir. 1989) (holding that white woman who was not object of 
discrimination, but who alleged injury because of race discrimination 
against another, was a "person aggrieved" within the meaning of Title 
VII); Stewart v. Hanson, 675 F.2d 846, 850 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding white 
woman who had been deprived of interracial associations in workplace a 
"person aggrieved" within meaning of Title VII); EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 
F.2d 439, 451-54 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 915 (1978) 
(holding that white female had standing under Title VII to challenge her 
employee's alleged racial discrimination against blacks); Waters v. 
Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 
915 (1977) (holding that white woman who sued under Title VII to enjoin 
racially discriminatory employment practices was"aggrieved person" 
within meaning of the statute); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, East, 545 F.2d 
169, 175 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that blacks who were not subjected to 
racial discrimination had standing under Title VII to sue over 
discrimination against other blacks). 
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alleged harm from the company's sex-based policies was 
not theoretical but involved actual economic harm, we 
concluded that he had been "subject to the discriminatory 
provisions of the pension plans under consideration." He 
would, therefore, be allowed to assert his claim. Id. 
 
In Hospital Council v. City of Pittsburgh, 949 F.2d 83, 87 
(3d Cir. 1991), we again discussed causation as a part of 
our analysis of standing. Hospital Council involved alleged 
threats by a city and county to discriminate against an 
association of non-profit, tax-exempt hospitals in matters 
relating to taxation, zoning, and public contracts if the 
hospitals did not make "voluntary" payments in lieu of 
taxes. 949 F.2d at 85. Although the complaint of the 
hospitals had alleged past and imminent harm, id ., the 
District Court dismissed the case for lack of standing on 
the theory that the alleged harm was not "real injury" that 
was "fairly traceable" to defendants' actions, but "purely 
hypothetical." Id. at 86. We reversed, explaining that 
 
       The complaint alleged a classic form of qualitatively 
       concrete injury -- direct financial harm. The complaint 
       alleged that members had been subjected to and were 
       threatened with discrimination in the initiation of tax 
       exemption challenges, the handling of zoning matters, 
       and the awarding of public contracts. It is obvious that 
       discrimination of this type is likely to cause direct 
       financial harm to the victims. 
 
Id. at 87. Accord Allen, 664 F. Supp. at 1553-57 (finding 
that males who had been terminated after firm-wide 
downsizing had standing to sue under Title VII, where they 
argued that management had closed the facility in question 
because it primarily employed women, whose jobs were 
deemed expendable). 
 
Because the male appellants here have pled specific facts 
to demonstrate a concrete injury as well as a nexus 
between the alleged injury and the sex-based 
discrimination, even though that discrimination was aimed 
in the first instance at others, we conclude that they have 
established standing. Their allegations that sex 
discrimination adversely affected their being hired as 
extras, as well as their seniority on the priority list, 
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demonstrate actual injury. We hold that indirect victims of 
sex-based discrimination have standing to assert claims 
under Title VII if they allege colorable claims of injury-in- 
fact that are fairly traceable to acts or omissions by 
defendants that are unlawful under the statute. That the 
injury at issue is characterized as indirect is immaterial, as 
long as it is traceable to the defendant's unlawful acts or 
omissions. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 689 n.14; Hospital Council, 
949 F.2d at 87.26 
 
We will, therefore, reverse the District Court'sfinding 
that the male appellants lack standing to assert their Title 
VII claims.27 
 
The foregoing analysis is equally applicable to the District 
Court's dismissal for lack of standing of the male 
appellants' NJLAD claims. This result is suggested by the 
substantive law construing various aspects of the NJLAD 
that has been developed by the New Jersey courts, 
including the state law on standing. See, e.g., Craig v. 
Suburban Cablevision, Inc., 660 A.2d 505, 507-09 (N.J. 
1995) (holding that relatives and friends of person who 
brought employment discrimination claim under NJLAD 
had standing to bring retaliatory discharge claim against 
their common employer); see also Erickson v. Marsh & 
McLennan Co., Inc., 569 A.2d 793, 798-99 (N.J. 1990) 
(explaining that New Jersey supreme court has adopted 
methodology of proof used in Title VII cases for NJLAD 
cases); Shaner v. Horizon Bancorp., 561 A.2d 1130, 1132 
(N.J. 1989) (noting that LAD standards "have been 
influenced markedly by experience derived from litigation 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
26. In fact, Hackett, 445 F.2d at 445-46, Rosen, 477 F.2d at 94, and 
Hospital Council, 949 F.2d at 87, arguably stand for the proposition that, 
where the alleged harm is pecuniary, a Title VII action should be 
characterized as involving direct discrimination, as opposed to indirect 
discrimination, even if the plaintiffs were not the objects of bias in the 
first instance. Since other courts have termed such discrimination 
"indirect" and we find the terminology irrelevant to our standing 
analysis, however, we will not base our holding on this reading of our 
precedent. 
 
27. Because appellants limit their eligibility for standing to the 
pecuniary 
harm theory, we will not address the propriety of asserting, in the 
employment context, an associational claim for standing. 
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under federal anti-discrimination statutes"). This result is 
also suggested by the structural similarities between Title 
VII and the New Jersey anti-discrimination law, as 
discussed more fully infra in Section IV.B. 
 
       b. Failure to Exhaust 
 
       i. Sexual Harassment Claims 
 
The District Court's dismissal of the female appellants' 
hostile work environment sexual harassment claims was 
based on its determination that their EEOC charges did not 
state a complaint of sexual harassment. As the court 
framed the issue, its concern with the charges related to 
"whether appellants' EEOC complaint was worded 
sufficiently to place the EEOC on notice of appellants' 
hostile work environment claims." Anjelino, 1993 WL 
170209 at *9. Because appellants referred in their initial 
EEOC charges to an "abusive atmosphere" rather than to a 
"hostile work environment," the District Court concluded 
that the appellants' charges were too vague to give notice of 
sexual harassment claims. Id. Based on its view that an 
appreciable difference exists between the terms"abusive 
atmosphere" and "hostile work environment," the District 
Court dismissed the sexual harassment claims for failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies. Id. The legal precedent 
cited by the court was Howze v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp., 750 F.2d 1208, 1212 (3d Cir. 1984) and Ostapowicz 
v. Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 394 (3d Cir. 1976). The 
court construed these cases as supporting its view that the 
phrases "abusive atmosphere" and "hostile work 
environment" are sufficiently different to warrant the 
dismissal of the appellants' sexual harassment claims. 
Anjelino, 1993 WL 170209 at *9. 
 
We do not agree, however, either with the interpretation 
given by the District Court to Howze and Ostapowicz or 
with the result at which the District Court arrived. Our 
disagreement is best explained by starting with our 
discussion in Ostapowicz of why a preliminary EEOC claim 
is necessary. 
 
Ostapowicz was a Title VII class action in which an 
employer was found to have engaged in sex discrimination 
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in job classifications, resulting in women being laid-off from 
work, while men with less seniority were either retained or 
recalled to work at an earlier date than the women. 541 
F.2d at 396-97. In Ostapowicz, we set out the procedures 
for filing discrimination claims and the reasons for following 
these procedures: When an "aggrieved person"files a claim 
with the EEOC, the agency notifies the employer and 
conducts an investigation. If the charge reasonably appears 
to be true, the EEOC attempts conciliation. If conciliation 
does not succeed, the EEOC notifies the aggrieved party of 
his or her right to bring suit. The preliminary step of the 
filing of the EEOC charge and the receipt of the right to sue 
notification are "essential parts of the statutory plan, 
designed to correct discrimination through administrative 
conciliation and persuasion if possible, rather than by 
formal court action." Id. at 398. Because the aim of the 
statutory scheme is to resolve disputes by informal 
conciliation, prior to litigation, suits in the district court are 
limited to matters of which the EEOC has had notice and 
a chance, if appropriate, to settle. Id. at 398. 
 
In Ostapowicz, the defendants claimed on appeal that the 
District Court had lacked jurisdiction to hear the case 
because the right to sue letter, upon which the plaintiff 
relied in filing suit, and the EEOC's initial report in the 
case only concerned employees in the company's shipping 
division. The plaintiff worked in a different division. 
Subsequently, however, the plaintiff filed additional EEOC 
charges that related to the division in which she worked. Id. 
at 399. Several months after the additional charges were 
filed, the plaintiff and certain of her co-workers requested 
and received right to sue letters from the EEOC. In the suit 
against the employer, the plaintiff and other members of 
the class referred to both the initial and subsequent EEOC 
charges. 
 
On these facts, we rejected the defendant's argument that 
the scope of the initial charges deprived the trial court of 
jurisdiction to hear the case. We found that the additional 
charges, which were filed during the pendency of the 
administrative proceedings, "may fairly be considered 
explanations of the original charge and growing out of it." 
Id. In this way, we affirmed that the"parameters of a civil 
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action in the District Court are defined by the scope of the 
EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to 
grow out of the charge of discrimination, including new acts 
which occurred during the pendency of proceedings before 
the Commission." Id. at 398-99 (citing Gamble v. 
Birmingham Southern R.R. Co., 514 F.2d 678 (5th Cir. 
1975); Oubichon v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569 
(9th Cir. 1973)). 
 
Because the EEOC had cognizance of the full scope of the 
situation during its settlement efforts, the purpose of the 
notification requirement had been served. 
 
In Hicks v. ABT Assoc. Inc., 572 F.2d 960 (3d Cir. 1978), 
we arrived at the same conclusion concerning the nature of 
the filing requirement and its effect on the court's subject 
matter jurisdiction in discrimination suits. In Hicks, the 
plaintiff had filed claims of race discrimination and 
retaliation with the EEOC. His subsequent law suit also 
contained a claim for sex discrimination. The District Court 
dismissed this claim on the ground that it was 
jurisdictionally barred because Hicks had not filed a sex 
discrimination charge with the EEOC. Hicks claimed that 
he had attempted to amend his charge but that the EEOC 
had refused to accept the amendment. In view of this 
factual disparity, we reversed, holding that a court could 
hear a claim of sex discrimination where it was unclear 
whether the EEOC had improperly refused to amend 
charges, and commenting that the "charges are most often 
drafted by one who is not well versed in the art of legal 
description. . . . [T]he scope of the original charge should be 
liberally construed." Id. at 965. We pointed out that the 
purpose of the filing requirement is to enable the EEOC to 
investigate and, if cause is found, to attempt to use 
informal means to reach a settlement of the dispute. Id. at 
963. If the complaint is not well founded or if reconciliation 
is not successful, a right to sue letter is issued to the 
complainant. 
 
       Thus, the effect of the filing requirement is essentially 
       to permit the EEOC to use informal, non-judicial 
       means of reconciling the differences between the 
       charging party and an employer. 
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Id. (citing Ostapowicz). 
 
Once again, in Howze, a Title VII suit in which the 
plaintiff alleged that she had been denied a promotion due 
to racial discrimination, we reversed the District Court's 
determination that the plaintiff could not amend her 
complaint to include a claim of retaliation. 750 F.2d at 
1209-12. The defendant argued that the plaintiff should not 
have been given leave to amend her complaint because no 
evidence had been presented that the retaliation claim was 
ever submitted to the EEOC. Id. at 1212. The court found, 
however, that, as in Ostapowicz, the plaintiff's "new 
retaliation claim may fairly be considered [an] explanation[ ] 
of the original charge . . .." Id. (citations omitted) (relying on 
Hicks to hold that EEOC investigation does not set outer 
limits on the scope of the civil complaint.) Moreover, the 
EEOC completed its investigation and determined that 
there was no reasonable cause to believe that the employer 
had discriminated against Howze before it issued its right 
to sue letter. 
 
In light of the precedent established by Ostapowicz, 
Hicks, and Howze, we do not find, as the Times claims, 
that these cases support its position that the appellants 
failed to exhaust their administrative remedy on the sexual 
harassment claim. We conclude to the contrary that 
appellants' notification of their charges was sufficient 
because the terms "abusive," "hostile,""environment," and 
"atmosphere" have been used interchangeably to describe 
sexual harassment. In particular, appellants support the 
sufficiency of their charges with references to recent 
Supreme Court and Third Circuit decisions concerning 
sexual harassment. See, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank FSB v. 
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64, 66-67 (1986); Harris v. Forklift 
Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 23 (1993); Knabe v. Boury 
Corp., 114 F.3d 407, 410 (3d Cir. 1997); West v. 
Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 753 (3d Cir. 1995); 
Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 445-47, 449 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
We agree with the appellants that the terms are 
interchangeable. This interchangeability convinces us that 
the harassment charge was within the scope of the 
complaints before the EEOC. See Ostapowicz, 541 F.2d at 
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396-97; Howze, 750 F.2d at 1212; Hicks, 572 F.2d at 964- 
65.28 
 
The foregoing analysis also applies to the dismissal of the 
female appellants' NJLAD sexual harassment claims for 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. This result is 
suggested by the similarities between the procedural 
requirements of Title VII and NJLAD, and the work-sharing 
agreements between the two agencies, pursuant to which 
the NJDCR deferred handling of the NJLAD claims to the 
EEOC. See App. at 490-94 (letter from NJDCR identifying 
charges investigated by the EEOC pursuant to work 
sharing agreement); see also 29 C.F.R. SS 1601.13(a)(4)(ii), 
1626.10(c) (describing work-sharing agreements between 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
28. Because we find the terms interchangeable, we will not go to consider 
what further information, such as the original complaint with its section 
entitled "Hostile Work Environment" or the appellants' January 5, 1993, 
affidavits, the EEOC would have had the opportunity to consider if it had 
completed its investigation, rather than issuing the right to sue letters 
prior to its completion. The present case differs from Ostapowicz, Hicks, 
and Howze in that the EEOC did not perform any in-depth investigation 
and made no attempt at reconciliation. Moreover, the EEOC 
acknowledged that it could not complete its investigation within the 
statutory 180 days; for this reason, the EEOC stated that it would issue 
the right to sue letters so that the appellants could proceed in court 
without waiting for any further investigation by the EEOC. If, however, 
the EEOC had pursued its investigation, it would have had before it not 
only the original charges, alleging "abusive atmosphere" but also a copy 
of the original district court complaint and the affidavits. In a case in 
which the EEOC has conducted a complete investigation, it will have 
presumptively prepared a report explaining the reasons for its 
recommendation; completed a running case log indicating all actions 
taken in the case, 1 EEOC Compliance Manual (BNA),S 22.16 & 22.17, 
at 22:0012; id S 29, at 29:0001-04; and assembled a file containing the 
investigator's work product, jurisdictional items, and relevant evidence. 
Id. at S 28, at 28:0001-02. When we held in Ostapowicz and Howze that 
the scope of a Title VII action in federal District Court is determined by 
the initial charges filed with the EEOC and subsequent explanations or 
outgrowths of these charges, we did so in cases in which such an 
investigation of the charges had been conducted and records of the 
EEOC's actions had been compiled. We will leave to another day the 
question whether the EEOC should be presumed to have notification of 
such subsequently filed allegations when it does not complete its 
investigation prior to issuing the right to sue letter. 
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EEOC and state agencies); id. at S 1601.70 & 1601.71 
(describing deferral process). 
 
However, our conclusion as to the claims against the 
Times does not apply to the claims against the Union. The 
District Court's dismissal of all Title VII and NJLAD claims 
brought by the appellants against the Union and appellee 
McDonald is affirmed. We will affirm the dismissal of all 
claims against the Union because the Union was not the 
employer of the appellants; this is so even though some of 
the supervisors and workers who are alleged to have 
discriminated against the appellants may have been 
members of the Union. While a union may be held liable 
under Title VII, the record here does not demonstrate that 
the Union itself instigated or actively supported the 
discriminatory acts allegedly experienced by the appellants. 
Therefore, the Union is not liable. See Carbon Fuel Co. v. 
United Mine Workers, 444 U.S. 212, 217-18 (1979); Berger 
v. Iron Workers, Local 201, 843 F.2d 1395, 1429-30 (D.C. 
Cir. 1988); see Philadelphia Marine Trade Assoc. v. Local 
291 Int'l. Longshoremen's Ass'n., 909 F.2d 754, 757 (3d 
Cir. 1990). Rather, the Times was the party responsible for 
assigning work to the appellants and ensuring that the 
work place was not contaminated with sex- and race-based 
discrimination and harassment.29 
 
We will also affirm the dismissal of the Title VII and 
NJLAD claims brought against the Union because the 
appellants have not demonstrated that they exhausted the 
Union's internal grievance procedures before filing 
administrative charges with the EEOC and this civil action.30 
We find that the appellants' failure to exhaust internal 
administrative remedies negatively impacts their ability to 
prove the Union liable under Title VII and the NJLAD. We 
discuss more fully our reasoning regarding the appellants' 
failure to exhaust the Union's internal grievance procedures 
infra, in Section IV.A.3. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
29. See App. at 105, 1103, 1136. 
 
30. See, e.g., App. at 1682, 1767, 2387. 
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       ii. Retaliation Claims 
 
The District Court noted that the EEOC had not issued 
right to sue letters to the appellants regarding their 
retaliation claims and then dismissed these claims for 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Anjelino, 
1993 WL 170209 at *10. We will reverse this dismissal of 
the retaliation claim for failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies on essentially the same basis as we reverse the 
court's dismissal of the female appellants' hostile work 
environment claim. 
 
In the case at bar, the alleged retaliatory delistment 
occurred after the appellants initiallyfiled administrative 
charges in May and June of 1992, and after they originally 
filed a complaint in June of 1992. Thus, it would have been 
impossible for the appellants to have included the 
retaliatory delistment among their initial charges and 
original complaint. 
 
While the record does not show that the appellants 
requested right to sue letters from the EEOC prior to filing 
their Amended Complaint, for the reasons stated supra, we 
will not penalize the appellants for the EEOC's failure to 
follow up on the retaliatory discharge charges, or for their 
attorneys' failure to request right to sue letters, where the 
appellants were entitled to such letters as a matter of right, 
29 C.F.R. S 1601.28(a)(2), and where letters had been 
received with respect to the initial charges. Under these 
circumstances, and in light of the numerous allegations of 
discrimination contained in the record, we will reverse this 
dismissal for failure to exhaust. See Zipes, 455 U.S. at 392- 
98; Robinson, 107 F.3d at 1021; Hornsby , 787 F.2d at 89. 
We find support for this conclusion in Ostapowicz, 541 
F.2d at 398-99 (the "parameters of a civil action in the 
District Court are defined by the scope of the EEOC 
investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out 
of the charges of discrimination, including new acts which 
occurred during the pendency of proceedings before the 
Commission"), and Howze, 750 F.2d at 1212 (plaintiff's 
"new retaliation claim may fairly be considered[an] 
explanation[ ] of the original charge"). Moreover, we have 
held that the failure to obtain a right-to-sue letter, in 
particular a second one for a retaliation claim, is curable at 
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any point during the pendency of the action. Gooding v. 
Warner-Lambert Co., 744 F.2d 354, 357-59 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(eschewing "highly technical pleading rules, which only 
serve to trap the unwary practitioner," in favor of notice 
pleading; reversing dismissal of Title VII action where 
second right-to-sue letter issued after complaintfiled); 
accord Williams v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 
721 F.2d 1412, 1418 n. 12 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Fouche v. 
Jekyll Island-State Park Auth., 713 F.2d 1518, 1525 (11th 
Cir. 1983). Under these circumstances, we find that the 
appellants acted with due diligence.31  
 
       c. Timeliness 
 
       i. Sex and Race Discrimination and Retaliation 
       Claims under Title VII 
 
Of the sex and race discrimination claims that survived 
dismissal on other grounds, the Court limited those 
brought under NJLAD to events occurring after June 1990 
and those brought under Title VII to events occurring after 
July 1991. This dismissal for lack of timeliness was based 
on the court's determination that, except for their 
delistment, the appellants had not alleged a single 
objectionable policy or practice that occurred within the 
limitations period. Anjelino, 1993 WL 170209 at *7. The 
court reasoned that the appellants would not be able to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that their claims 
were not stale or that their allegations met the standards 
for applying the continuing violations theory of timeliness. 
Id. at *6-8. 
 
However, as we discuss supra in Part III, the District 
Court reviewed these claims under Rule 12(b)(1) rather 
than under Rule 12 (b)(6) or Rule 56. In doing so, the court 
failed to consider the significance of the fact that the 
appellants claimed that certain alleged acts of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
31. The Amended Complaint also added three new plaintiffs, Maureen 
Dolphin, Jacqueline Fogarty, and Ronald Plakis, who had not filed 
charges of any kind with the EEOC. The appellants have not mentioned 
the dismissal of these three plaintiffs in their briefs; we do not, 
therefore, 
address this issue. 
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discrimination took place within the limitations period. The 
Times disputed these claims of timeliness before the 
District Court and continues to do so on appeal. Thus, 
whether any of the claims were timely is a question of 
disputed material fact. See, e.g., Hicks, 572 F.2d at 963-66. 
Rather than weighing the credibility of the parties' positions 
on this disputed issue, the District Court should under 
Rule 12 (b)(6) and Rule 56 have left such considerations to 
a jury. See Williams v. Borough of West Chester , 891 F.2d 
458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 
 
       ii. Sex and Race Discrimination and Retaliation 
       Claims under NJLAD 
 
We also find that the District Court erred in dismissing 
the appellants' NJLAD claims for lack of timeliness. Our 
decision regarding the timeliness of the appellants' NJLAD 
claims is controlled by Montells v. Haynes, 627 A.2d 654 
(N.J. 1993). In Montells, the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
held that a two year statute of limitations applies to all 
NJLAD claims. Id. at 659-61. Prior to Montells, it had not 
been clear whether NJLAD claims were subject to a six year 
or a two year statute of limitations. Id. at 661. Whereas 
New Jersey courts generally had applied the shorter term, 
Leese v. Doe, 440 A.2d 1166, 1168 (N.J. 1981), the federal 
courts tended to apply the longer limitations period. See 
White v. Johnson & Johnson Prod., Inc., 712 F. Supp. 33 
(D.N.J. 1989) (applying six year limitations period); United 
States v. Bd. of Educ., 798 F. Supp. 1093, 1095 (D.N.J. 
1992) (same). 
 
Although the Montells court found that the two year 
statute of limitations would apply uniformly to all NJLAD 
claims, the court held that its decision would only apply 
prospectively. 627 A.2d at 661-62. Thus, all claims filed 
prior to July 23, 1993, the date that the opinion was 
issued, were subject to a six year limitations period. Under 
Montells, the appellants' NJLAD claims, which were filed in 
August of 1992, are subject to the six year statute. Thus, 
these claims are not time-barred. 
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2. Section 1981 Sex and Race Discrimination and 
       Retaliation Claims 
 
a. Sex Discrimination and Retaliation Claims 
 
The section 1981 claims brought by Hispanic women for 
alleged sex discrimination and/or harassment were 
dismissed by the District Court on ground that gender- 
related claims are not cognizable under this statute. 
Anjelino, 1993 WL 170209 at *11. We will affirm the District 
Court's dismissal of the gender related claims on this basis. 
Because the statute, on its face, is limited to issues of 
racial discrimination in the making and enforcing of  
contracts,32 courts have concluded that sex-based claims 
are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. S 1981. See, e.g., Bobo 
v. ITT, Continental Baking Co., 662 F.2d 340, 343 (5th Cir. 
1981) ("The drafters of [section] 1981 had no intention to 
disturb public or private authority to discriminate against 
women."); Montano v. Amstar Corp., 502 F. Supp. 295, 296- 
97 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (denying motion by African-American 
woman to amend her complaint to include sexual 
harassment claim); see also Runyon v. McCrary , 427 U.S. 
160, 167 (1976) (dictum). 
 
       b. Race Discrimination and Retaliation Claims 
 
The District Court limited the Hispanic appellants' 
section 1981 race discrimination claims to events occurring 
after June 1990. Anjelino, 1993 WL 170209 at *11. The 
court reasoned that the claims should be so limited 
because the appellants were unable to demonstrate 
continuing violations. Id. 
 
Based on our reasoning concerning the timeliness of the 
NJLAD claims, we will reverse the dismissal of the section 
1981 racial discrimination and retaliation claims. We do so 
because in cases decided prior to Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 
261 (1985), the federal courts, for purposes of establishing 
a limitations period, analogized section 1981 claims to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
32. 42 U.S.C. S 1981 provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]ll persons 
within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in 
every State ... to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white 
citizens...." 42 U.S.C. S 1981. 
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claims under state limitations periods, either personal 
injury or breach of contract claims. See, e.g., Runyon, 427 
U.S. at 180-82 (affirming application of state two year 
personal injury statute of limitations to section 1981 
claims). This borrowing was necessary because section 
1981 does not contain a limitations period. See Johnson v. 
Ry. Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 464-65 (1975). As we 
discuss above, prior to Montells, NJLAD claims were 
subjected to the same limitations analysis. See , e.g., White, 
712 F. Supp. at 34-35 (D.N.J. 1989). Furthermore, when an 
action contained both section 1981 and NJLAD claims, the 
courts presumed that the same statute of limitations would 
apply. Id. Prior to Montells, the federal courts in New Jersey 
would apply a two or a six year statute of limitations to 
section 1981 and NJLAD claims, based on whether a court 
analogized a claim as one for personal injury or contract. 
 
As explained above, however, the federal courts no longer 
have to guess which statute of limitations applies to NJLAD 
claims. In Montells, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided 
that a two year statute of limitations should apply to all 
NJLAD claims. 627 A.2d at 659. The Montells court 
determined, however, that the two year limitations period 
would not apply to cases filed prior to the date of that 
decision. 
 
We adopt the reasoning of the Montells court and find 
that the appellants, who filed the instant section 1981 
action prior to the decision in Montells and who may 
reasonably have relied on cases applying the longer period 
to both section 1981 and NJLAD claims, are entitled to a 
six year limitations period. Accord Al-Khazraji v. St. Francis 
College, 784 F.2d 505, 511-14 (3d Cir. 1986), aff'd, 481 
U.S. 604, 607-10 (1987) (refusing to apply Pennsylvania 
personal injury statute of limitations retroactively when 
there was no reliable holding which statute of limitations 
applied when appellant's section 1981 claims arose); White, 
712 F. Supp. at 34-35 (applying six year statute of 
limitations to NJLAD claims and section 1981 claims to 
avoid injustice of applying new limitations period 
occasioned by change in substantive law retroactively). 
 
The foregoing analysis does not apply to the Union 
defendants for the reasons cited in the Section IV.A.1.b. For 
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the reasons stated there, we will affirm the dismissal the 
Title VII and NJLAD claims against the Union. 
 
3. LMRA and LMRDA Claims 
 
The Court dismissed the appellants' claims against the 
Union, McDonald, and the Times under the LMRA on 
grounds of timeliness, Anjelino, 1993 WL 170209 at *12-13, 
and because the Court determined that the appellants had 
not exhausted the Union's internal remedies prior to filing 
suit. Id. at *13. Likewise, appellants' claims under Title I of 
the LMRDA were dismissed for failure to exhaust and lack 
of timeliness. 
 
We will affirm the dismissal of these claims because the 
appellants have not demonstrated that they exhausted the 
Union's internal grievance procedures prior to filing charges 
against the Union and the Times. In particular, the District 
Court's dismissal of the LMRA and LMRDA claims was 
based on its finding that the appellants' complaints to the 
Union regarding their alleged mistreatment by Times' 
personnel were being presented to the Baar Committee at 
the same time that they were before the District Court. See 
Anjelino, 1993 WL 170209 at *13-14. Under these 
circumstances, we find that dismissal of the LMRA claims 
was appropriate. See Angst v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 969 F.2d 
1530, 1538 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that union members 
were required to exhaust grievance and arbitration 
procedures contained in CBA prior to filing suit under 
LMRA); see also Clayton v. Int'l. Auto. Workers, 451 U.S. 
679, 692 (1981). 
 
For the same reason, we will affirm the dismissal of the 
LMRDA claims. See Pawlark v. Greerwalt, 628 F.2d 826, 
830-31 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083 (1981) 
(stating that internal exhaustion requirement is not 
absolute and reversing dismissal of LMRDA on record of 
particular case, but noting that suits by union members 
who cannot demonstrate a "valid reason" for failing to 
exhaust internal procedures usually will be dismissed by 
trial courts).  
 
B. Matters Dismissed on Summary Judgment 
 
In its Orders of August 22, 1996, and March 2, 1997, the 
District Court dismissed, inter alia, the remaining Title VII 
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and NJLAD sex and race discrimination and retaliation 
claims of the non-Hispanic and Hispanic appellants, 
respectively, on summary judgment grounds. Thus, the 
court determined that there were no genuine issues of 
disputed material fact that precluded dismissal of these 
claims prior to trial. This ruling can no longer stand, 
however, because our rulings on failure to exhaust and lack 
of standing and our modification of the limitations period 
have reinstated as material many factual issues that were 
not considered by the District Court in its consideration of 
the motion for summary judgment. Because of the revival of 
disputed factual issues, summary judgment may no longer 
be appropriate. 
 
On remand, the District Court must review these issues 
in light of Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56 standards. We caution 
the District Court that, in doing so, it may need to 
reconsider its prior ruling that the Baar Award is sufficient 
in and of itself to constitute a "legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for rejection." We add this note of 
caution because of the expansion of the relevant time 
period to be considered and the impact that further factual 
development may have on this conclusion by the District 
Court. We point in particular to the findings of the 1988 
Adelman Award concerning the standards of enforcement 
over the years of the Baar Award. See App. at 124-137. The 
issue of whether the Baar Award has been enforced and/or 
strictly complied with may affect the disparate treatment 
and the disparate impact claims. 
 




The District Court's denial of the appellants' motion for 
further discovery was based on representations made by 
appellants' counsel to a magistrate judge in an affidavit 
opposing a motion to dismiss the case. In the affidavit, 
counsel stated that "[p]laintiffs are prepared to go to trial at 
this time, and do not require further discovery." App. at 
688. The District Court found this declaration to be a 
"tactical decision, made in the particular context [of a 
motion to dismiss], to forgo the obvious advantages of 
discovery in order to move the litigation forward . . .." App. 
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at 25. Applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel, which the 
court characterized as designed "to prevent litigants from 
engaging in precisely this kind of `tactical' decision- 
making," the court refused the appellants' request to 
overturn the magistrate's order denying them further 
discovery. 
 
The appellants argue on appeal that the District Court 
abused its discretion in affirming the order denying them 
discovery. They claim that counsel's statement that no 
further discovery was needed was based on the assumption 
that no party would be granted further discovery; they 
assert that it was not inconsistent with prior 
representations by counsel or made in bad faith. For this 
reason, they urge that the court should not have affirmed 
the order on grounds of judicial estoppel. The appellants 
argue that, by allowing the appellees to proceed with 
discovery while denying the same to them, the District 
Court "profoundly changed the balance between the 
parties." 
 
We find, however, that the District Court did not abuse 
its discretion by holding counsel to the representation that 
no further discovery was needed. On the basis of the record 
before us, we find no cause for disturbing the court's 
application of judicial estoppel to "preserve the integrity of 
the courts by preventing litigants from `playing fast and 
loose with the courts.' " Anjelino, No. 92-2582 (Jan. 29, 
1996) at 3 (quoting Scarano v. Central R.R. Co. of New 
Jersey, 203 F.2d 510, 513 (3d Cir. 1953)); accord McNemar 
v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 616-17 (3d Cir. 1996); 
Lewandowski v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 882 F.2d 815, 
819 (3d Cir. 1989). The District Court's order denying 




Although a trial court has considerable discretion in 
imposing sanctions, it is settled law that an attorney must 
have notice and an opportunity to be heard on the 
possibility of being sanctioned, consistent with the 
mandates of the due process clause of the Constitution. 
Martin v. Brown, 63 F.3d 1252, 1262-64 (3d Cir. 1995). The 
requisite notice must be "particularized" so that a party is 
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aware of the "particular factors that he must address if he 
is to avoid sanctions." Jones v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Corp., 899 
F.2d 1350, 1357 (3d Cir. 1990). We have vacated orders 
imposing sanctions where we found that notice was not 
sufficiently particularized. For instance, we will consider it 
an abuse of a district court's discretion if it does not made 
it clear that an attorney might be sanctioned pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. S 1927,33 which requires a finding of bad faith for 
the imposition of sanctions, see Hackman v. Valley Fair, 
932 F.2d 239, 241-42 (3d Cir. 1991), as distinguished from 
Rule 11, Fed.R. Civ.P., which does not require such a 
finding, see Fellheimer, 57 F.3d at 1225. Accord Martin, 63 
F.3d at 1262-64. 
 
Moreover, sanctions relating to abuse of the discovery 
process must reflect reasonable costs incurred as a result 
of an attorney's misconduct. See Martin, 63 F.3d at 1262- 
64. In order to facilitate our review of orders imposing 
sanctions on this ground, we therefore require that a 
district court make explicit the basis for its imposition of 
discovery related sanctions. It is impossible for us to 
determine whether a court has exercised sound discretion 
in imposing sanctions if the record does not provide a 
justification for the order. Id. at 1264. 
 
After reviewing these prerequisites for the imposition of 
sanctions, we find that the District Court's order imposing 
sanctions upon appellants' counsel must be vacated. 
Although the court's order to show cause regarding the 
possibility of sanctions states the court's view that 
appellants' motion to reconsider was "an improper 
rehashing of issues already decided," the order to show 
cause did not give notice as to the legal basis for the 
possible sanctions. App. at 30. For instance, it did not refer 
to 28 U.S.C. S 1927. The District Court's failure to give 
particularized notice to counsel was inconsistent with our 




33. This statute states, in pertinent part, that "any attorney ... who so 
multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously 
may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, 
expenses, and attorney's fees reasonably incurred because of such 
conduct." 28 U.S.C. S 1927. 
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Moreover, while the order imposing sanctions did set 
forth the statutory basis for the court's action, the $5,000 
penalty imposed by the court was not based upon an 
assessment of reasonable costs of counsel's misconduct. 
This, too, is grounds for our finding that the Court abused 
its discretion in imposing sanctions upon appellants' 




For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse in part and 
affirm in part the District Court's orders dismissing the 
Amended Complaint, and we will remand this case for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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